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How Brexit is changing the dynamic between the Executive and Legislature

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Without getting overly philosophical, what are the constitutional foundations that give the Executive its authority? It cannot be democracy, for citizens of the UK do not vote for who sits in Downing Street. Rather, general elections are held to decide the Members of Parliament (MPs), and it is the party that wins the most number of seats in the Commons that gets to form government.

In other words, the government is a creature of the Commons. Traditionally, the entire existence of the Executive hinges on its commanding of the respect of democratic Parliament. Parliament is sovereign, and Parliament delegates power to the Executive to carry out the daily business of running the country. Parliament sits at the top of the constitutional hierarchy.

How does the Commons compel the Executive to follow their wishes? There are two views. Firstly, the narrow view holds that the threat of a ‘no confidence vote’ keeps the Executive in check. Secondly, the broader view is that since the government’s legitimacy stems from its support from the Commons, thus there is almost a critical morality to do only as Parliament wishes, because that represents what the People wish as well.

It is important to note here whatever one may say about morality, one cannot deny the lack of teeth that a ‘moral argument’ makes. If the Executive’s obedience to the Common’s will is solely based on a constitutional convention – one that is not even crystallised, then it is open to abuse, as we will see later.

But onto a more positive, utopian note. In 2013, the Commons voted, 285-272, that it did not support the military actions that David Cameron’s government proposed. Labour leader Ed Miliband the Commons had spoken “for the people of Britain”. David Cameron said that he would respect the defeat his government faced and not join the US for allied air strikes in Syria.

This seems to lend credence to the optimistic version of the Executive-Legislature dynamic: that the Executive would automatically respect the will of the Legislature without the Commons having to pull out any sticks. But Brexit threatens to change it all.

With Brexit, there seems to be a heavy focus on the UK’s foreign relationships. It makes sense – after all, we are negotiating to leave the EU, so negotiations with the EU, the status of EU law and EU court rulings dominate the conversation.

It might therefore comes as a surprise that the more insidious and perhaps even more significant paradigm shift is taking place right before our very eyes, on home territory. Here is the fundamental conundrum: the Commons has made it clear that they do not want Britain on a ‘no deal exit’. To do so, they are willing to pull out all the stops – including extending the Brexit deadline.

But where things stand now, we are onboard a train hurtling inevitably toward a no deal exit. Unless somebody does something radical, this would seem to be the default outcome, considering that a simple deal cannot even get passed through the House.

May’s government does not seem willing to rule out the possibility of a ‘no deal exit’. Why? Surely she recognises that a no deal exit will be harmful to the country! In fact, she probably does. But the people have spoken, and in May’s immortal words, “Brexit means Brexit!”.

So therein lies the reason why May can blatantly pursue a policy so at odds with the Commons. This is what distinguished her from David Cameron’s Syria business – the referendum.

Brexit has altered the basic dynamic that the government cannot go against the will of the Houses. Because democracy is the ultimate authority in the country, and, whereas before, the Executive derived its democratic mandate from its majority in the Commons, today it has democratic legitimacy as a result of a third party, external source of authority – the referendum.

The referendum represents the raw will of the People, and is arguably stronger than Parliament itself. The Executive is taking advantage of this new source of legitimacy to “get its business through the Houses”, with or without their consent.

This new dynamic finds very close parallels with the American system of the isolated Executive. There, the President, independently from the Legislature, receives a mandate from the people. This gives him the legitimacy to operate at complete odds with the Legislature. Indeed, this has infamously led to government shutdowns. The UK might find itself in a similar situation.

The facts that gave rise to the infamous Miller case are the perfect example of this new dynamic – May wanting to invoke article 50 using the Royal Prerogative, without Parliamentary intervention. There has even been talk that the Executive might make use of the Queen to exercise her Royal Prerogative to bypass Parliament.

They can do so in two ways: firstly, to ask the Queen to refuse her Royal Assent on a Bills that have been approved by the Houses, most notably on a Bill that might delay the date of Brexit. Secondly, as suggested by Jacob Rees Mogg, to invoke the Queen’s power of prorogation to suspend Parliament – making MPs physically unable to pass anymore laws.

This is completely unprecedented. Prerogatives such as Royal Assent, authoritarian as they might seem, have been traditionally restrained by the operation of constitutional conventions. So much so that we have taken it for granted that such powers would not be exercised in a way that might contradict tradition. Alas conventions are not legally enforceable.

This goes to show that only reason why the Executive dares to even think about convincing the Queen to take off her cloak of political neutrality is the big ‘B’ word – Brexit. The referendum has given the Executive the mandate to leave the EU. The biggest problem? That the results were unclear – “Leave” – is as vague as it gets, and the Executive has been capitalising on this, to put its own spin on what the vote actually meant, and therefore on what they have been empowered to do.

So this is a refute to the broad view – that since Brexit, the Executive arguably no longer derives its legitimacy from the Commons, thus is free to pursue an independent policy. What about the narrow view? The threat of a ‘no-confidence’ vote? Anyone who has been watching the news would tell you that it has already happened. And Theresa May seems to be saying “If you don’t like me, vote me out. But if you can’t, and I’m still here, then don’t try to stop me.”

Can Brexit get any crazier?

Cher-Yi Tan is a Senior Writer and was the previous Editor-in-Chief at the YLJ. He is currently reading for the BCL at Wadham College, Oxford.

Legal

Look at Afghanistan; why human rights are inextricably linked with the rule of law

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Behind the guise of legality, numerous injustices have disregarded human dignity. Yet, in modern society, we often dangerously misinterpret justice and legality as synonymous. One such atrocity is ‘slavery’. However, Raz claims that ‘slavery’, does not infringe on a state’s capacity to govern within the boundaries of the rule of law. 

This is because Raz views the law through the lens of the present, ie what it is, as opposed to future aims, ie what it should be. In doing so, Raz separates the ‘law’ from any ideological, moral or philosophical ideas. Raz outlines that the law can do good and bad and has no inherent moral philosophy attributed to it. Raz’s definition makes no distinguishment between mere legality and a law that embodies justice.

However, I find this theory disagreeable, as it neglects the relationship between human rights and the rule of law.  

It is generally agreed that the primary function of the rule of law is to protect citizens from unpredictable and/or arbitrary powers (of the government or other citizens). This is impossible to do without recognising and encouraging human rights. If human rights are not upheld, the position of a group or individual within a society is not guaranteed to be secure and thus can be changed unpredictably and/or arbitrarily. One cannot protect or ensure stable prospects if their status in society is akin to a torturous limbo. 

Now, direct your attention to the current situation in Afghanistan, where citizens fear day-to-day activities in case of arbitrary power used against them. Particularly affecting women and girls. One may draw attention to female education. Whilst currently girls are allowed to attend school, the situation is growing uncertain and fearful. Without any formal recognition of the right to female education, many families may choose to not send their daughters to school, or institutions may not enrol girls just in case of a change or growing extremist pressures. Likely, pubescent girls will not be able to gain an education. Living in fear, unsure of one’s status and rights day-to-day, is not recognising the rule of law.  

Raz may argue; if there is an intelligible and accessible law banning female education, that this would constitute the rule of law. However, this is incorrect as it discriminately disregards human dignity, whereas, within the rule of law, the law must view everyone equally. This is not an ideological statement, but a practical one. If the law can arbitrarily persecute one group, there is no logical boundary preventing the persecution of another group, as all humans are made equally. The law cannot discriminate. 

But what if nobody was allowed an education? 

If we are to take Raz’s argument to its extreme it is still flawed. This is because no country that respects human dignity would ban or pervert education, as this can be linked to other fundamental rights. Any country that threatens to ban education essentially imprisons and enslaves its citizens, tyrannically stripping rights and causing a power imbalance between government and citizens. 

I echo Bingham’s opinion, that the rule of law and human rights are inextricable. Any law that offends human rights does not align with the rule of law or good governance, as there is a distinction between mere legality and observing the rule of law. 

Hosseini, an extract from A Thousand Splendid Suns;

‘“It is my responsibility to maintain order”…She was stunned that he’d used that word in the face of all that the Mujahideen factions had done- the murders, the lootings, the rapes, the tortures, the executions, the bombings, the tens of thousands of rockets they had fired, heedless of all the innocent people who die in the crossfire. Order. ‘

The law, as a tool, should be used positively, carving parameters of a present and ideal future society, ie what it should be. This ensures that human rights are predictable not only today but should be upheld in future generations too. By implementing such irremovable rights, a citizen’s position within society is secure and predictable for the future, decreasing the potential for the future tyrannical rule, encouraging good governance. 

In the current global political climate, we must not be blind. Order is not a good order. Without distinguishment, we cannot hold ourselves or others accountable for actions that disregard human rights and dignity. The notion that we should not aim for a world where human rights are respected, or at least regarded as inextricable to the rule of law, is a world that does not value human dignity. No good order, no peace can be birthed from a land tense with fear and arbitrary actions. Ironically, Biden’s recreant retreat from the ‘forever war’ has reinflicted suffering, in the name of order. When will we learn?

The rule of law is inextricable from human rights.

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Legal

The UK Constitutional Framework: Twists and Turns

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The United Kingdom is unusual in having no constitution set out in a single document. But the history of the last hundred years of near universal suffrage has not suggested that this has been an impediment to the operation of a successful parliamentary democracy and calls for change in this area, although frequent, have given rise to little visible public support. Yet our constitution has certainly not been static in this period. Both devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and our membership of the EU – as well as our departure from it – have all given rise to significant constitutional change.

Underpinning our system are largely unwritten rules of conduct for the executive and Parliament that create the trust which is essential for a political community to function and for minorities to accept majority decisions. This is a process of debate and legislation conducted within ground rules that ensure that all sides will feel that a matter of importance has been properly considered, with divergent views taken into account. It also provides a framework that conditions the use of executive power when the government enjoys a parliamentary majority, preventing abuse and supporting the right to opposition. When it is working, it has been one of our country’s defining strengths; both in the flexibility it gives government and in identifying us as a political community united by the way we govern ourselves.

But there are, to my mind, worrying signs that this framework is in danger of being abandoned. Recent events have created a number of instances where the government has departed dramatically from these standards.

The first example is the attempt at proroguing Parliament by the PM in September 2019. As a royal prerogative power to be exercised on the advice of the PM, it should have been obvious that it should not be used to silence Parliament at a time of national crisis, however convenient it might have been to the government to avoid parliamentary scrutiny when it was mired in a crisis with the EU on the terms of our departure. Yet not only did the government proceed with prorogation, but it also did not tell the truth about its plans to do so and was unable, when challenged in court, to provide a valid constitutional basis for it, relying in reality on an argument that the power to prorogue was a naked political power that was non-justiciable.

A similar slide from acceptable constitutional practice can be seen in the November decision to amend the Internal Market Bill in a way that was in clear breach of our inter- national legal obligations under the Northern Ireland Protocol of the Withdrawal Agreement. There was of course nothing legally to prevent the government acting in this way. Under our dualist system, an international legal obligation is unenforceable in our courts without domestic legislation and the government was going to repeal that legislation. But to deliberately break international law in this way was unprecedented by a UK government. It also required the PM to ignore his own Ministerial Code that included a requirement for ministers to respect the rule of law – which previous UK governments had argued in court included international law as well. Notably, participation in drafting the legislation was in breach of the Code of Conduct for Civil Servants for the same reason. But the Cabinet Secretary instructed them to ignore its terms to conform to the PM’s instructions.

When I was Attorney General, it was a part of the Attorney’s role not just to advise on the law but also to seek to ensure that a government behaved with propriety. It was part of the Attorney’s remit to do this because it was the policy of successive governments that they should be seen at all times to be doing so. In the case of the Internal Markets Bill, the present Attorney not only provided a “legal” justification for breaching international law that fell well outside the range of what was reasonably arguable, but also reinterpreted the Ministerial Code in contradiction of the government’s previous position, thus avoiding the embarrassment of the PM having to rewrite the Code first.

It may be hoped that these examples are a reflection of the extraordinary pressures that the government was under during the Brexit process. But such cavalier disregard for both the rule of law and constitutional convention has the potential for long-term effects. The handling of the Covid-19 crisis has seen an astonishing abandonment of ordinary rules of legislative propriety. Helped by a largely complaisant House of Commons, the Government has been enabled to enact and exploit loosely worded legislation giving it the power to regulate and penalise individuals by creating serious criminal offences by decree, without even the need for advance parliamentary approval. Not surprisingly, some of the rules have been so broad as to give rise to arbitrary enforcement and injustice. Of course, some of this may have been excusable by the nature of the current emergency, but none of it was an inevitable necessity. Rather, the measures were simply short-cuts taken for the sake of convenience. Again it was noticeable that when the Secretary of State for Health came out with dire and frankly ridiculous threats of ten year sentences for forgery for providing misleading information on a health information form, it did not look as if the Law Officers had been consulted about this policy statement at all.

Fortunately for us, these failings in our democratic processes are not at present fatal to its continuance. The Supreme Court stepped in to check the capricious abuse of the power of prorogation by the PM by interpreting the law, and the House of Lords fulfilled its remit as a revising chamber by removing the offending clauses of the Internal Markets Bill which had domestic and international opinion mobilised against them. But that is not the same as good and quiet governance to which wise governments should seek to aspire. As we head towards the next big crisis (probably with Scotland) and see the headlines filled with stories of internecine feuds within a Downing Street “Court”, we should not be complacent and assume that politics is all about the chaotic exercise of power moderated only by General Elections. We have in the past enjoyed, and are entitled to, better.

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Legal

A Runaway Decision? Discussing and Defending R (Plan B Earth) v Secretary of State for Transport

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Few events have generated quite the volume and complexity of litigation as the Heathrow expansion. In Plan B, the Court of Appeal decided that the Secretary of State’s (SoS) decision to designate a National Policy Statement (NPS) under s.5 of the Planning Act 2008—supporting plans to build a third ‘north-west’ runway at Heathrow—was unlawful. While environmental campaigners may hail the decision as a triumph against globally polluting mega-corporations, its real intrigue lies in its robust use of unincorporated treaties to determine the scope of domestic law obligations, and the Court’s determination to provide a remedy in circumstances where the unlawful decision may have been retrospectively corrected.

 

The Facts

When the SoS designates an NPS (under the Planning Act 2008, s.5), planning applications must be decided in accordance with it. The SoS supported the Heathrow expansion in the UK’s ‘Airports National Policy Statement’ (ANPS). Three grounds of appeal were made. Two concerned EU law, which failed. The third, which succeeded, challenged the SoS for failing to take into account a relevant consideration: the Paris Agreement 2016.

In making an NPS, the SoS must, under the Planning Act 2008 s.10(3), ‘have regard to the desirability of… mitigating, and adapting to, climate change’ and, under s.5(8), give reasons as to how the NPS takes government policy on climate change into account. It was common ground, however, that he did not consider the Paris Agreement 2016, an unincorporated international treaty. Indeed, he had received legal advice that he was ‘not permitted as a matter of law to take [the Agreement] into account’ ([237]).

 

Treaty Incorporation

The issue that arose was whether the SoS was required to take the Paris Agreement into account as ‘government policy’. In deciding that it was a relevant consideration, the Court has been accused of incorporating international law ‘through the back door’: that is, without the consent of Parliament. Mills (2020) sees a tension with this outcome and the principle of ‘dualism’ in the British Constitution, by which treaties do not form part of domestic law ‘until incorporated by legislation’. Campbell (2020) also questions the desirability of requiring the Agreement to be taken into account, because the ‘political substance’ of the decision is left open to challenge, transgressing the Court’s judicial function. I will test both criticisms in turn.

To Mills, we first must assert that the Court is not acting on its own terms, giving the Paris Agreement a life of its own. It is given a clear warrant to do so by s.5(8) of the Planning Act 2008, which requires ‘government policy’ on climate change to be taken into account. If it is correct to consider the treaty ‘government policy’ (our second criticism, considered later) then the conclusion is surely that the Court is requiring something ‘conventional’ ([230]): that the ‘executive must comply with the will of Parliament’ ([229]).

Furthermore, using unincorporated treaties to define the scope of statutory obligations is not a radical, controversial prospect; indeed, it is entirely conventional. For example, in R (Al-Jedda) v Defence Secretary, the House of Lords used several unincorporated treaties (UNSC Res 1545 and Article 103 of the UN Charter) to define the scope of rights under the Human Rights Act 1998. Several other cases follow the same example, such as Occidental Exploration v Ecuador.

To Campbell, we start with the Cambridge English Dictionary’s definition of ‘policy’: ‘a plan of what to do [that] has been agreed to [by] a government’. With this definition in mind, several factors are pointing towards the Court’s decision being correct. Not only did the Government ratify the treaty in 2016 (making it a ‘plan’ that has been ‘agreed to’), they actively agreed to adhere to it in several Ministerial statements ([237]). As the Court correctly states, ‘policy is necessarily broader than legislation’ ([224])

Moreover, a narrow definition of policy would be undesirable from the perspective of good administration. This case sets a precedent that the Government must adhere to its promises, preventing Ministers from breaking political commitments with impunity. This is not a challenge to the ‘political substance’ of the decision, as Campbell suggests, but the legitimate use of an unincorporated treaty, through the warrant of statute, to ensure the Government does not regress from its promises.

 

The Question of Relief

The Government then argued that the court should refuse to grant a remedy. This was because, even though the SoS had not taken the Paris Agreement into account when developing the ANPS, he would still have considered it when individuals apply for specific projects related to the policy. Thus, it would be ‘highly likely’ that the outcome would not have been ‘substantially different’ if the Paris Agreement had been taken into account, per s.31 of the Senior Courts Act (SCA) 1981 ([274]).

Nevertheless, the Court granted a declaration of unlawfulness. It did not matter that the unlawfulness in the policy designation could have been rectified later: it was ‘incumbent on the Government to approach the decision-making process in accordance with the law at each stage’ ([275]). Furthermore, the public interest in climate change issues would have warranted the provision of a remedy in any case ([277]), per SCA 1981 s.31(2B).

It is easy to see why Campbell (2020) has criticised the case as ‘insufficiently cautious’ with the provision of remedies. The modification of the SCA 1981 was intended to expand the number of cases in which courts would refuse to provide a remedy from the stringent Simplex test. Under this old test, it was necessary to show that the decision-maker ‘necessarily’ would still have made the same decision. This threshold was lowered because the Government was concerned with ‘busybodies’ challenging, for example, planning decisions—abusing judicial review and disrupting infrastructure.

Despite this, the Court stated that ‘Parliament has not altered the fundamental relationship between the courts and the executive’ ([273]). This means that, even under the Act, courts should not assess the ‘merits’ of the decision. For this reason, it will be ‘difficult’ or even ‘impossible’ to refuse a remedy where there has been an error of law ([273]).

There is a paradox at the heart of this dictum. The Court seems cautious by refusing to contemplate the merits of the decision; but, in so doing, the judges are expanding, not restricting, their powers. Under the pretence of keeping to their proper role, they are ensuring that the rule of law is upheld to a standard not far from the original Simplex test. I would suggest that this is because the Court is overusing the term ‘merits’. Assessing the ‘merits’ is asking the question: is the decision correct? This is not what the Court is asking by refusing to grant a remedy. It is asking: what are the likely implications of the decision? These questions are related, but they are not the same. Indeed, if the Court is cautious to consider the implications of a decision it is hard to see when a remedy would ever be, in reality, refused.

Nevertheless, the decision is correct on the facts. Two points should be remembered. First, the Court was especially firm because the SoS had received legal advice to the effect that the Government was not permitted to take the Paris Agreement into account. This was a clear ‘misdirection’ in law ([275]), and it is possible to see why this is—at least slightly—more significant than neglecting to consider the Agreement. Second, the Court did not quash the decision, instead merely granting a declaration of unlawfulness. I would suggest this, in fact, takes careful consideration of the seriousness of the error and the consequences of the breach.

 

Conclusion

Although, at first glance, this case might look like judicial overreach, I have argued that Plan B enforces reasonable, robust limits on administrative discretion. The Government has decided not to appeal this decision—little wonder, given Boris Johnson’s pledge to ‘lie down in front of those bulldozers and stop the construction’ (Carrington (2020), The Guardian)—but Heathrow will do. The fasten-seatbelt sign has come on: there is more turbulent legal thinking to come.

 

Many thanks to Frederick Cheng for his valuable comments on the first draft of this article and to Professor Alison Young for her initial guidance. All remaining errors are my own.

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